The brain plus the cultural transmission mechanism determine the nature of
language by Smith, Kenny et al.
on L1 acquisition, I argue that the authors’ elegant conceptualiz-
ation and simulations of the logical problem of language evol-
ution do not necessarily translate to the untidy developmental
facts of language acquisition in the current linguistic environ-
ment. Specifically, it may be premature on C&C’s part to advo-
cate general-purpose cognitive mechanisms alone to explain
child language learning and the repertoire of rule types that
governs it.
As a first step, terms such as “language-specific constraints”
and “general-cognitive constraints” must be regarded with
caution. While domain specificity is often readily identified,
domain generality is frequently a “moving target,” precisely
because it is definable by degree. That is, we say that a mechan-
ism is domain-specific so long as it only does what it evolved to
do, or as long as it is only used for learning within its domain.
But we can only say that a mechanism is more or less domain-
general: It is more domain-general or neutral the more it gener-
alizes to other tasks outside its domain. In principle, this effect
may not be problematic – after all, lots of phylogenic and onto-
genic distinctions involve matters of degree. In synchronic
terms, any general mechanisms of cognition do not dispense
with the specific ones; instead, the existence of general machin-
ery presupposes the existence of functionally related specific
mechanisms. When dealing with the countless complexities of
linguistic structure, Skinner’s box cannot afford to be empty: it
must at least contain a random assortment of various entities
(paraphrasing Satterfield & Saleemi 2003). In other words, the
basis from which L1 development commences had better be
minimally equipped to supply learners with knowledge of gram-
matical functions, and Case systems, and so on, just in case chil-
dren encounter these properties in their primary linguistic data.
Second, C&C state that
if language is viewed as having been shaped by the brain, then
language learning is by no means a standard problem of induc-
tion . . . instead, the task is simply to give the same answer as
everybody else – because the structure of language will have
adapted to conform to this most “popular” guess. (sect. 8.1,
para. 2)
This view has several consequences in the developmental context
that are not easy to explain. Consider the following cases: (1)
Children in American English-speaking environments are
widely attested to omit subject pronouns in tensed clauses
(e.g., Toys in there; Hyams 1986). (2) They also insert an extra
wh-expression in long-distance questions: for example, “What
do you think what pigs eat?” (Crain & Thorton 1998). The struc-
tures in question seem to be at odds with “everybody else” – for
example, with adult English, which contains no such features
(although these are by no means “wild guesses,” since in the
former case [1], languages like Standard Spanish and Italian
pattern somewhat in this way; and in the latter case [2], certain
German dialects would be appropriate). However, it would be
computationally “easier” to simply have a zero or deleted Com-
plementizer in this site, rather than the wh-word. These tokens
beg the question of why children should exhibit such tendencies
at all. Perhaps the task requires children to initially exert multiple
types of “biases” in order to obtain the maximal advantages of the
grammar (Gawlitzek-Maiwald & Tracy 2005; Roeper 1999;
Saleemi 2002; Satterfield 1999a; 1999b; Yang 1999; 2002).
On common ground with C&C, it is doubtful that a highly
language (domain)-specific Universal Grammar (UG) functions
as the sole machinery in the child’s task of language acquisition.
However, this position need not exclude the possibility that child-
ren pick which apparatuses they use, more-generalized or less-
generalized tools, and to what degree, in a flexible and adaptive
manner. Keeping this postulation in mind, consider the critical
period in L1 acquisition. It has been successfully argued that
not all aspects of language display critical period effects. Specifi-
cally, the acquisition of lexical items, the concatenation of words,
and the nuts and bolts of semantically based principles of word
order seem immune to age-related “atrophy” of language acqui-
sition (Hudson & Newport 1999; Jackendoff 2002; Sorace 2003).
However, the capacity to acquire other parts of language in
late language learning, such as the inflectional system or real
intricacies in phrase structure, appears to be largely dimini-
shed (Lardiere 1998; 2000). These common L1 versus L2
conditions become at once isolatable by viewing language acqui-
sition as a multi-layered construction with distinct learning
mechanisms.
Ultimately, the solution to the logical problem of language
acquisition may reside in the possibility of possessing several
initial knowledge states in which domain-general mechanisms
interact with domain-specific components designed to acquire
the most arbitrary and least systematic knowledge of the target
grammar. States that stabilize over several progressive stages
could then emerge, with the help of additional domain-general
learning mechanisms, which handle increasingly more systema-
tic principles of the grammar. In sum, each transitional state
may be shaped by the myriad effects of learning, or, more appro-
priately, of acquisition, which can be viewed as the combina-
tion of experience and internally determined processes such
as maturation, learning mechanisms, and language-specific
computations.
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Abstract: We agree that language adapts to the brain, but we note that
language also has to adapt to brain-external constraints, such as those
arising from properties of the cultural transmission medium. The
hypothesis that Christiansen & Chater (C&C) raise in the target article
not only has profound consequences for our understanding of
language, but also for our understanding of the biological evolution of
the language faculty.
Christiansen & Chater (C&C) provide a thought-provoking
account of language as a cultural adaptation to the minds of
language learners: Language evolves through repeated cultural
transmission, adapting to multiple pressures impinging upon its
learning, representation, and use. This strikes us as a powerful
explanatory framework, and we hope the target article will stimu-
late more work fleshing out the precise relationship between con-
straints on language arising from the brain and features of
linguistic structure.
In fact, we believe that there are two respects in which the
target article actually understates the full implications of this
hypothesis. First, C&C focus on language as an adaptation to
language learners’ brains – but language must also adapt to con-
straints external to the human mind. Second, in discussing their
account’s implications for understanding biological evolution,
C&C point out the “moving target” problem – but there are at
least two further issues with the interaction of cultural and bio-
logical evolution they do not recognize. Taken together, these
completely change the viability of accounts based on the adaptive
Commentary/Christiansen & Chater: Language as shaped by the brain
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:5 533
evolution of a strongly constraining, domain-specific biological
faculty for language.
Although there are, of course, fundamental differences
between the account offered by C&C and the Universal
Grammar (UG) account they contrast it with, it is useful never-
theless to focus on a point of similarity: Both argue that language
is how it is because the mind forces it to be so (the crucial differ-
ence being the extent to which the relevant mental components
are domain-specific or domain-general, and who does the fitting
to what). Both postulate a good fit between observed properties
of language and properties of the human mind: if we see some
linguistic property in the world, we can reasonably infer that it
reflects a property of our minds.
We have previously demonstrated, however (Kirby 1999;
Kirby et al. 2004), that mental properties cannot simply be
read off from language universals, because the cultural process
mediating between aspects of the mind and features of language
distorts the underlying biases of human learners. For example,
culture can amplify weak biases to give strong universal effects.
This means that cultural transmission can obscure underlying
differences in mental structure: for example, strong universal
tendencies towards regularity can result from various levels of
preference for regularity in individual learners, and (in extreme
cases) the same observed distribution of languages can result
from learners with widely differing strengths of preference for
regularity (Kirby et al. 2007).
This suggests that, while we can probably get an idea of the
general flavour of the human mind from observable linguistic
properties, making specific inferences is more risky. To draw
appropriate conclusions from a given distribution of languages,
we must understand the rather opaque relationship between
mental properties and linguistic properties resulting from cul-
tural transmission.
Furthermore, not all pressures acting on language during its
transmission are mental: language is not only well adapted to
its users’ brains, but also to its medium of transmission. Compu-
tational modelling work highlights the importance of the learning
bottleneck: learners must infer the structure of an infinitely large
language from a finite subset. This bottleneck introduces a
pressure for generalisation to which language must adapt, for
example, by becoming compositional (Kirby 2001; Smith et al.
2003a). Importantly, the bottleneck is not a property of language
learners’ brains, but rather of the medium through which
language is transmitted, namely, a finite dataset. Linguistic prop-
erties that are eminently learnable (and therefore well adapted to
the brain) may be disfavoured due to this transmission factor, or
vice versa. Consequently, linguistic features represent a product
of, or a compromise between, several pressures acting on
language transmission, some (but not all) of which reside in the
human brain.
There are therefore good practical reasons for taking cultural
evolution seriously. However, cultural evolution is more than
just a methodological hassle for cognitive scientists: the same
arguments radically alter the plausibility of scenarios for the evol-
ution of the language faculty. C&C point out one problem for
biological evolution, which arises from cultural transmission –
evolution is chasing a moving target. We raise an additional
problem: Given the opaque relationship between mental and
linguistic features, much of the human biological capacity for
language will be shielded (Ackley & Littman 1992) from evol-
ution. For example, Kirby et al. (2007) show that the strength
of prior preferences for particular structures in language
arising from an individual’s biology may have no effect on the
strength of the resulting universals. Under this scenario, selection
is completely blind to the strength of the prior biases of indivi-
duals and there is no selection for nativisation, nor for stronger,
“more desirable” prior preferences for certain languages
(Smith & Kirby 2008).
Furthermore, cultural transmission may actually hinder the
evolution of a priori functional domain-specific features of the
language faculty: Evolving biases for communicatively functional
languages is problematic for culturally transmitted languages,
because the biases of individual learners require a critical mass
of learners and a reasonable span of cultural time to make their
advantageous properties felt (Smith 2004). Indeed, based on
such models, we expect that practically the only scenario under
which biological evolution will favour particular language-learn-
ing predispositions is when those predispositions are domain-
general, and selected for on account of their less problematic
(acultural, non-linguistic) applications. While this is entirely con-
sistent with C&C’s argument, we believe it also follows naturally
from taking cultural evolution seriously.
So if evolving a functional domain-specific set of language
biases is problematic, how can we best understand the evolution
of the human faculty for language? C&C force us to revisit
the human uniqueness of language from a comparative pers-
pective, and (we suggest) pose a fascinating, important new
challenge for evolutionary biology: Which of their suggested
domain-general pressures responsible for shaping language
are unique to humans, and what can this tell us about the evol-
utionary origins of the species-unique trait of language? Are
there pre-adaptations for the cultural transmission of linguistic
systems (e.g., vocal learning capacity; intention-sharing ability)?
If so, how much linguistic structure naturally falls out of the
cultural transmission process once these pre-adaptations are
in place?
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Abstract: Christiansen & Chater (C&C) suggest that language is itself an
evolutionary system, and that natural languages “evolve” to be easy to
learn and process. The tight economy of the world’s case-marking
systems lends support to this hypothesis. Only two major case systems
occur, cross-linguistically, and noun phrases are seldom overtly case-
marked wherever zero-marking would be functionally practical.
All languages employ some morphosyntactic means of dis-
tinguishing the core noun phrase (NP) arguments within a
clause. The two basic predicate types are intransitive and transi-
tive verbs, giving three core grammatical functions: S indicates
intransitive subjects (The girl slept); A, “agent” of a transitive
verb (The girl saw a pig); and P, “patient” (The girl saw a pig).
Some languages (e.g., Chinese, English) distinguish A and P
using word order: thus, we know which mammal saw which,
because A always precedes the verb and P follows.
However, many languages employ case-marking to distinguish
A and P, as in Latin:
1a. Puella venit.
girl.(NOM) come.PRES.3SG
“The girl comes.”
1b. Puella puer-um audit.
girl.(NOM) boy-ACC hears.PRES.3SG
“The girl hears the boy.”
1c. Puella-m puer audit.
girl-ACC boy.(NOM) hear.PRES.3SG
“The boy hears the girl.”
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